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We consider a setting in which two potential buyers, one with a prior toehold and
one without, compete in a takeover modelled as an ascending auction with participating
costs. The toeholder is more aggressive during the takeover process because she is also
a seller of her own shares. The non-toeholder anticipates this extra-aggressiveness of the
toeholder. Thus, he is deterred from participating unless he has a high valuation for the
target company. This leads to large ine±ciency losses. For many con¯gurations, expected
target returns are ¯rst increasing then decreasing in the size of the toehold.
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11 Introduction
In many takeover cases, one bidder owns, prior to the ¯rst o®er, a toehold in the target
company. This is a well-documented fact, Betton and Eckbo (2000), for instance, observed in
a sample of 1353 tender o®er contests over the period 1971-1990 that in 36% of the contests,
a bidder owns a toehold greater than or equal to 10%. In the sample, the average toehold
size is equal to 14.57%.1 Now, the existence of such a toehold indisputably a®ects buyers'
motivations in the di®erent outcomes of the takeover. When a toeholder wins the takeover,
she needs to buy less shares than a standard bidder since she already owns a fraction of the
target company. In a way, winning is less costly for her than it is for a non-toeholder. When
she loses a contested takeover, she can sell her shares to the winner. She is no longer a buyer
of shares but rather a seller of her own shares. As any other shareholder, she prefers the
winning o®er to be as high as possible. In both cases, the pro¯t function of the toeholder
di®ers from the one of a non-toeholder. Therefore, the toehold a®ects both her motivation to
make a takeover o®er and her behavior during a (contested) takeover. We are interested in
understanding these two e®ects of the presence of a toehold and their impact on the outcome
of the takeover.2
We consider a framework with two potential bidders, one with a toehold and one without,
in which, as in Burkart (1995) and Singh (1998), a takeover is modeled as an ascending
auction with independent and private valuations. In this setting, Burkart (1995) and Singh
(1998) both observe an extra aggressiveness of the toeholder. She stays active (i.e. makes
countero®ers) for prices strictly higher than her valuation for the target ¯rm. This extra
aggressiveness is explained by the motivations we mentioned. In contrast, the toehold has no
e®ect on the strategy of the other bidder. He stays active as long as the price is below his
valuation for the ¯rm and leaves when the price is equal to his valuation. Thus, the toehold
smoothly increases the selling price of shares and deteriorates the e±ciency of the takeover
1For other empirical data on the presence of toeholds in a takeover context, see, for instance, Bradley,
Desai and Kim (1988), Franks and Harris (1989) or Jarrell and Poulsen (1989).
2As in a large part of the theoretical literature on the takeover issue (see Bulow et al (1999), Burkart
(1995), Singh (1998), Hirshleifer and Titman (1990)), we consider the forming of the toehold as an exogenous
phenomenon. Firms know that owning a toehold in a ¯rm that you want to buy is an advantage during the
takeover process. However, they cannot buy shares in the days or the weeks preceding the beginning of the
takeover because such a strategy is identi¯ed by the market. Potential competitors may react immediately
and the price of the shares rises so much that it is not worth buying this toehold (see Mikelson and Ruback
(1985) or Choi (1991)). This explains why, in most cases, ¯rms do not buy toeholds before making a takeover
o®er. Nevertheless, ¯rms do often own toeholds prior to make a takeover o®er. We explain the existence
of these toeholds with an extremely simpli¯ed two-periods representation. First, ¯rms who have access to a
limited amount of money buy shares of several ¯rms of their business sector (for instance, during IPOs or at
the time they build partnerships). Later, after several modi¯cations of the structure of the business sector, a
¯rm who bought shares may be interested in buying a company she invested in. Then, ¯rms are precisely in
the situation we are interested in. Such situations are often observed in the high tech business where major
companies invest in start-ups that they seldom buy later on or in countries in which the ¯rms' capital is
structured by these industrial investments : Germany, Italy, France, Spain...
2process.
Compared to this literature that only considers the bidding process, we intend to go
upstream and understand the impact of shareholdings both on bidding strategies and on the
decision to take part in the takeover process. To do that, we endogenize the participation
decision in the takeover contest by taking into account participating costs.3
We observe that even with very low participating costs, the toeholder may deter partially
or completely the non-toeholder from making any takeover o®er. The deterrence relies on the
extra-aggressiveness of the toeholder. This extra aggressiveness reduces the expected pro¯t
of the non-toeholder. Unless the non-toeholder has a high valuation for the target comany,
his expected pro¯t becomes lower than the participating cost.4 Then, in many cases, the
non-toeholder prefers not to participate to avoid incurring the participating cost.
The deterrence phenomenon relies on the toeholder aggressiveness and on the high prob-
ability for the toeholder to participate in the takeover process. The higher the probability
that the toeholder participates in the takeover is, the more she can deter the non-toeholder
from participating. Now, a limit to her participation is the existence of a de facto minimum
premium required by shareholders to sell their shares. This minimum premium reduces the
probability that the toeholder takes part in the takeover process and consequently reduces
the deterrence phenomenon. We observe that , for sensitive values of the participating cost
and the minimum premium, the deterrence is partial and progressive.
The impact of a toehold on target returns is dual. On the one side, if both bidders
participate in the takeover, the toeholder is more aggressive because of her toehold which
has a clear-cut positive impact on target returns. On the other side, precisely because of this
extra aggressiveness, the presence of a toehold deters other bidders from participating in the
takeover battle which reduces target returns. Eventually, there is no general and univocal
positive or negative e®ects of toeholds on shareholders revenue. Expected target returns
may be a non monotonic function of the size of the toehold. We can show that, in many
con¯gurations, they are ¯rst increasing then decreasing in the size of the toehold. These
results provide an explanation for the di±culties in ¯nding an empirically robust positive or
negative e®ect of toeholds on target returns. The non monotonicity obtained in our model
may explain the diverging results of empirical studies who intend to identify monotonic e®ects.
As a matter of fact, Betton and Eckbo (2000), Eckbo and Langohr (1989) and Jarell and
Poulsen (1989) observe negative impact of toeholds on target returns. However, Franks and
Harris observed that toeholds increase target returns and Stulz et al (1990) observed no e®ect
of toeholds on target returns.
3The cost of making a takeover attempt includes both opportunity costs and direct expenses paid to
bankers, lawyers and so on.
4Hirshleifer (1995, section 4.5) shows results close to ours. In particular, he also observes a deterrence
phenomenon. However, his results strongly rely on his perfect information assumption.
3Apart from Burkart (1995) and Singh (1998), toeholds in a takeover context have also
been considered as a way to alleviate the free rider problem in a single bidder context. In the
seminal paper of Grossman and Hart (1980) which ¯rst introduced the free-rider problem, a
bidder, even though she is the only one making an o®er, cannot derive any pro¯t from the
takeover process. Shareholders refuse to sell their shares below their values after the success
of the takeover. Thus, the raider does not make any pro¯t and too few takeovers are realized.
In contrast, if a bidder owns a toehold, she can, at least, make a pro¯t on the shares she
owned before the takeover. Thus, a larger toehold increases the probability of success of
the takeover attempt. Toeholds decrease the amount paid by the winner to shareholders.
These results ¯rst appeared in Shleifer and Vishny (1986), then, with some modi¯cations, in
Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) or Chowdry and Jeegadesh (1994).
Neither the Burkart-Singh model which describes a clear positive impact of toeholds
on target returns nor the free-rider model which says that toeholds have a negative e®ect on
target returns provides an explanation for the undecided empirical results that we mentioned.
Bulow Huang and Klemperer (1999) have a di®erent approach. They consider contested
takeovers among ¯nancial bidders. For this kind of bidders, they found that the common
value paradigm is more appropriate since ¯nancial bidders do not have private motivations
(synergies, modi¯cations of the market structure) for buying the target company. In this
framework, toeholds become more important because of e®ects related to the winner's curse
issue. They observe that an asymmetric distribution of toeholds induces low bids from
bidders with small toeholds and high bids from bidders with large toeholds. If toeholds are
distributed nearly symmetrically among bidders, they increase expected target returns. In
contrast, if they are distributed very asymmetrically, they decrease expected target returns.5
We believe that the limitation to ¯nancial bidders is too restrictive. In most cases, bidders
are not purely ¯nancial actors, they are strategic6 and valuations derive from motivations
speci¯c to each bidder.7 That is why we choose to represent the takeover process with the
private value paradigm.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In
section 3, we study a simple representation of the takeover process, no participating cost, no
minimum premium. In section 4, we enrich the model by taking into account participating
costs. In section 5, we consider the impact of the minimum premium required by shareholders.
At last, section 6 develops implications of our results and evokes their limits.
5There is no e±ciency issue since the valuation is the same for all the bidders.
6In the Bulow et al (1999) meaning of the word.
7Berkovich and Narayanan (1993), Gupta et al (1997) and Goergen and Reneboog (2002) all ¯nd strong
evidence that synergy is the prime motive for mergers and acquisitions.
42 The model
A takeover consists in alternate increasing o®ers by potential buyers. When a bidder makes
an o®er that no other bidder overbids, he buys all the shares on the market for that price.
Besides, we assume that it is not possible to renege on a previous o®er or to organize a
negotiation between bidders or between a bidder and the board of the target company. With
two bidders, as the size of the minimum increment between each o®er goes to zero, this
process becomes equivalent to an ascending auction. Therefore, we choose to model the
takeover process as an ascending auction with two potential buyers.8
We make the following assumptions regarding the takeover. (i) The aim of a takeover
attempt is, after taking control of the ¯rm, to bene¯t from synergies between the target
¯rm and the bidder. (ii) These synergies are bidder speci¯c and privately known. (iii) In
order to participate in the takeover process, bidders incur a commonly known sunk cost. (iv)
Shareholders do not accept to tender if they are not o®ered a minimum premium.
Formally, we have the following representation: ¯rm A is a potential target for two risk-
neutral bidders, 1 and 2. Each possible bidder i has a valuation vi for the target ¯rm which is
private information. It is common knowledge that valuations are independently drawn from
a uniform distribution on the interval [0;1]:9 It is also common knowledge that bidder 1 owns
a fraction ® of ¯rm A's capital with 0 < ® < 1
2.10
The takeover is represented by a two-stages game:
² Stage 1: both bidders decide simultaneously if they want to participate in the takeover
process.
Between stage 1 and stage 2, bidders who decided in stage 1 to participate pay a sunk
cost c ¸ 0. Participation decisions are observed by all the bidders.
² Stage 2: bidders who paid the sunk cost compete in an ascending auction de¯ned as
follows. From an initial value R ¸ 0, the price gradually increases. At any moment,
bidders can quit the auction. The auction stops when there is only one bidder left.
With two possible bidders, this is equivalent to the moment when the ¯rst bidder quits.
All the shares of ¯rm A are bought by the remaining bidder at the current price. If
both bidders quit for the same price, bidder 2 wins the takeover and buys the shares
for the common price.11
8There hardly exist any contested takeovers with more than two bidders.
9We normalized the Stock Exchange valorization of company A before the takeover process at zero. We
choose a uniform distribution for the sake of simplicity. The spirit of our results remains true for a wider
range of distribution functions.
10Most takeover regulations rules require bidders to disclose their initial stakes.
11For the existence of an equilibrium in cases considered in sections 4 and 5, this tie-breaking rule is required.
For more details on the link between tie-breaking rules and equilibrium, see Jackson et al (2002).
5Bidder 1 owns, before the takeover process, a fraction ® of the target ¯rm. If she is the
winner of the auction, she only buys a fraction (1 ¡®) of ¯rm A's capital. Conversely, if she
loses the auction, she sells her toehold to her opponent at the price de¯ned by the auction.12
On the other hand, bidder 2, if he does not win the auction, derives no pro¯t and, if he wins
the auction, buys the whole capital of ¯rm A. We can therefore de¯ne utility functions as
follows.
² If bidder 1 wins the takeover for a price p
U1 = v1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)p and U2 = 0
² If bidder 2 wins the takeover for a price p
U1 = ®p and U2 = v2 ¡ p
² If ¯rm A remains independent
U1 = U2 = 0
A strategy for bidder i is a couple (di;bi) with di : [0;1] ! f0;1g13 and bi : [0;1] ! [R;1).
di(vi) is the participation function of bidder i. If di(vi) = 1, bidder i participates in the
takeover process when his valuation is vi. If di(vi) = 0, bidder i does not participate in the
takeover process when his valuation is vi. bi(vi) is a bidding function, it is the price for which
bidder i, if his valuation is vi, quits the takeover process if he participates and bidder j is
still active.
In the remainder of the paper, we only consider equilibria with undominated strategies.
All the proofs are in the Appendix.
3 A simple representation of the takeover process
In this section, we focus on a simpli¯ed representation of the takeover. Participating to the
takeover is free of charge (c = 0). Stockholders accept to sell their shares for any price
over the quotation before the beginning of the takeover process (R = 0). We do not study
in details this con¯guration, we only need it as a benchmark. Besides, Burkart (1995) and
Singh (1998) already developed a complete analysis of this issue.
12The toeholder, if she loses, prefers selling her shares. If the non-toeholder takes control of the target
company, he will divert the synergies he can create. Thus, the toeholder is better o® selling her shares before
this dilution. Reciprocally, the winning company cannot refuse to buy his adversary's toehold at the price of
the winning tender.
13We rule out the possibility that a company participates with a probability q with 0 < q < 1 in order to
simplify the proofs we present. Our results would remain unchanged if we allowed buyers to randomize. At
the equilibrium, a bidder cannot randomize for an interval of valuations of positive measures
6Participating is free of charge, therefore, for i = 1;2 , for any vi 2 [0;1], di(vi) = 1 is a
dominant strategy. Bidders always participate in the takeover process. Thus, we can focus
on the second stage of the game.
Proposition 1 There is a unique equilibrium. Bidders always participate. Bidder 2 bids his








For bidder 2 who does not own a toehold, it is a weakly dominant strategy to leave the
takeover process for a price equal to his valuation. Leaving for a lower price, he could miss
an opportunity to make a strictly positive pro¯t. If he stays active while the price is higher
than his valuation and wins the takeover, he derives a strictly negative pro¯t.
This reasoning cannot be applied to bidder 1. Contrary to bidder 2, conditional on losing
the auction, she is not indi®erent to the price paid by her opponent. If she loses the auction,
she sells her shares and thus prefers the price to be the highest possible. Besides, in that
case, the ¯nal price is equal to the price for which she quits the takeover process. Thus, she
has incentives to quit for a price higher than her valuation in order to increase her revenue
conditional on losing the takeover. The toeholder submits her valuation plus a strictly positive
overbidding, ®
1+®(1 ¡ v1).
This overbidding is an increasing function of ®. The higher the fraction of the target
company bidder 1 holds, the more important it is for her to raise the price, conditional on
her losing the takeover. Besides, if she wins the takeover, she buys a fraction (1 ¡ ®) of the
target company which is smaller. The risk to pay a price higher than here valuation when
winning concerns a lower number of shares.
This overbidding is also decreasing in v1. More precisely, it is proportional to (1 ¡ v1),
the probability that bidder 2 has a higher valuation than bidder 1. Suppose that bidder 1
increases her bid by ". It increases her probability to win the takeover for a price higher than
her valuation by ". Moreover, she will sell her shares to bidder 2 for an " higher price with
a probability (1 ¡ v1 ¡ "). The risk is ¯xed but the probability to sell for a higher price is
increasing in (1¡v1). A high overbidding is thus more pro¯table for higher values of (1¡v1),
i.e. for low values of v1.14 The toeholder overbids to make bidder 2 pay a higher price. Thus,
the overbidding rises with the probability to increase the price paid by bidder 2.
14In a wider framework, with a non uniform distribution function, the elements to consider would be
(1 ¡ F(v1)) and the probability that bidder 2 leaves for a price in the interval [v1;v1 + "].
73.1 E±ciency
Bidder 2 quits when the price is equal to his valuation. Bidder 1 quits for a price strictly
higher than her valuation.15 As a result, if v1 < v2 < b1(v1), bidder 1 wins the takeover while
bidder 2 has a higher valuation for the target company. Because of the toehold, the takeover
battle is not an e±cient way to allocate the target ¯rm. The initial distribution of property
rights does have an in°uence on the e±ciency of the allocation procedure.
The overbidding is increasing in ®. As a result, the probability of an ine±cient allocation,
equal to E[b(v1) ¡ v1)] = ®
2+2®, is also increasing in ®.
3.2 The owner's curse
Bidder 1's overbidding has another consequence. She quits the takeover process for a price
exceeding her valuation. Thus, if bidder 2 quits when the price is in the interval (v1;b1(v1)),
bidder 1 wins the takeover and pays a price for which she would have strictly preferred
losing. Because of her toehold, bidder 1 bids more aggressively. Eventually, she may be
victim of her aggressiveness. Burkart (1995) and Singh (1998) described in details this issue
named owner's curse by Burkart. Despite this owner's curse, the expected utility of bidder
1,
(v1+®)2
2+2® , is increasing in ®. The increased probability of buying shares for a price exceeding
their means value is more than compensated by the advantage of owning an ex-ante toehold.
3.3 The price
The other stockholders of the target ¯rm are not concerned by e±ciency considerations as
long as they sell their shares for the highest possible price. The ¯nal price is their only
concern. For them, the existence of the toehold has a positive impact. Bidder 2's strategy
is not a®ected by the toehold while the price for which bidder 1 quits the takeover increases
with the size of her toehold. As far as revenue is concerned, it seems that the impact of the
toehold is unambiguously positive. In the following sections, we will see that this result is
questionable.
4 Taking participating costs into account
In this section, we take into account the positive cost to participate in a takeover. The
participation decision becomes endogenous. As a result, we observe a dramatic deterrence
e®ect.
In the previous section, we assumed that participating in a takeover is free of charge. This
assumption is not credible. Participating in a takeover is costly. First, it requires the mobi-
15Except when v1 = 1.
8lization of the ¯nance direction and the high management which represents an opportunity
cost for the ¯rm. Besides, no major takeover is launched without calling on the expensive
services of experts such as consulting ¯rms, bankers, lawyers.16 Whatever the result of the
auction is, a bidder that participates in the takeover process has to pay the type of expenses
that we have mentioned. Thus, these are sunk costs.
We will show that these sunk costs dramatically change our analysis of the e®ects of the
toehold. But ¯rst, note that the participation decision becomes endogenous because of the
existence of these sunk costs. Since participating is costly, the participation decision becomes
an issue.
Proposition 2 8c;® > 0, in any equilibrium, bidders' behaviors are as follows: bidder 2
never participates, bidder 1 participates when her valuation is at least equal to c and for
c · v1; b1(v1) ¸ 1.
Bidder 2 never participates in the takeover process. He is fully deterred by bidder 1. This
is true whatever the values of ® and c are as long as they are strictly positive.
The intuition is as follows. At the equilibrium, there is a minimum valuation v for which
bidder 2 participates in the takeover process. Besides, if he participates in the takeover
process, it is a dominant strategy for him to quit when the current price is equal to his
valuation. Bidder 1, if she loses the contested takeover, prefers the ¯nal price to be as high
as possible since, in that case, she sells her shares for this price. As a result, if both bidders
participate, bidder 1 never quits the auction for a price below v. Thus, if bidder 1 participates,
bidder 2, when he has a valuation of v, does not derive any pro¯t from his participation in
the takeover while he has to pay a participation cost c > 0. He would have been better
o®, not participating. As he can anticipate that such an event will occur, he prefers not to
participate. This argument remains true for any value of v since bidder 1 participates with
a high probability, i.e. whenever v1 ¸ c. As a result, the deterrence phenomenon is complete
even if the participating cost and the toehold are small.
By taking into consideration the participating costs, we endogenized the decision to par-
ticipate in the takeover. It dramatically changes our previous analysis of the impact of the
toehold. Bidder 1 fully deters bidder 2 from participating. The price paid to the remaining
shareholders is always zero, i.e. the Stock Exchange quotation before the takeover. The
allocation is ine±cient with a probability higher than 1
2 and these results are true for any
strictly positive value of the sunk cost.
These results rely on bidder 1's caring about the price paid even when she loses. She can
credibly commit to bid up in case bidder 2 would participate in the auction. This commitment
16When Vodafone bought Mannesman, it payed more than a billion dollars to its lawyers and bankers. It
was not even a contested takeover.
9is so strong that it completely deters bidder 2 from making any takeover o®er whatever his
valuation for the target ¯rm is.
Regarding the robustness of this result, we can observe that the complete deterrence does
not rely on the limitation to two competitors. Suppose that we have n ¸ 2 competitors
without toehold and one with a toehold. Then, the following strategies are constitutive of an
equilibrium: bidder 1, the bidder with a toehold, participates whenever her valuation for the
target ¯rm is at least c. If any other bidder participates, bidder 1 quits the takeover process
for a price equal to 1. The n other competitors never participate. All the bidders without
toehold are fully deterred.
However, the choice of a uniform function is not neutral. It a®ects the extent of the
deterrence phenomenon. Complete deterrence would not hold with any distribution func-
tion. However, there is a deterrence e®ect whatever the distribution function that we could
consider. The deterrence phenomenon would exist for any distribution function. But, it
would be less pronounced for some other distribution functions. However, we observe that
the strategies introduced in proposition 2 that leads to complete deterrence are constitutive
of an equilibrium with any distribution F provided that F(c) · c. The necessary condition
for the existence of such an equilibrium only concerns the lower part of the distribution.
The lower the probability that bidder 1 have a valuation below c, the participating cost, the
stronger the deterrence phenomenon is.
This deterrence phenomenon dramatically changes our analysis of the e®ect of toeholds.
Unlike what we tended to infer from the results of the previous section, the impact of a
toehold for the remaining stockholders is not always positive. On the contrary, it can be
extremely negative if we integrate its in°uence on the decision to participate in the takeover
process or not. Even a relatively small toehold may have a dramatic deterrence e®ect and an
extremely negative impact on the expected revenue of remaining stockholders.
5 Analysis of the takeover with shareholders requiring a min-
imum premium
5.1 The context
In this section, we assume that shareholders may refuse to sell their shares if they are not
o®ered a minimum premium. We obtain more balanced results with such a setting.
In the previous section, we observed that, if participating in the takeover is costly, the ¯nal
price is always zero, that is the stock exchange quotation before the beginning of the takeover
process. However, empirical studies show that even when the takeover is not contested,
bidders almost always o®er a bonus to shareholders.
10Several theoretical reasons have been given for justifying this bonus. We mention here
the explanation given in Stulz (1988) and Stulz and al (1990) which is compatible with the
other assumptions of our model.
We assume that shareholders have speci¯c attributes such as liquidity or tax consider-
ations that a®ect their tendering decisions. Therefore, the supply of shares tendered is an
increasing function of the price per share o®ered by the bidder. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that shareholders are distributed in two groups. All the members of a group have in
common a minimum price for which they agree to sell their shares. Shareholders of the ¯rst
group accept to sale their shares for a price equal to the current Stock Exchange valorization,
zero. Shareholders of the second group because of these tax and liquidity considerations
refuse to sell their shares for a price below R > 0. Shareholders of the second group are
numerous enough so that, in order to be successful, bidders must propose a price for the
shares at least equal to R, the commonly known minimum premium.
In practice, integrating these elements in our model is equivalent to the addition of a
reserve price. As a matter of fact, if a bidder proposes a price below this minimum price, too
many stockholders refuse to sell their shares and the takeover attempt fails. This minimum
price may be a function of the size of the toehold and may vary across bidders. Nevertheless,
as a ¯rst approximation, we consider a unique given reserve price for both bidders.
5.2 The general analysis
To rule out trivial cases, we assume that c + R < 1:17 We obtain the results stated in the
following lemma and proposition.
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In an equilibrium in which the third series of conditions are satis¯ed, bidder 1 fully deters
bidder 2 from participating. In an equilibrium in which one of the two ¯rst series of conditions
is satis¯ed, both bidders participate with a strictly positive probability.18
Complete deterrence is no longer the general rule. It only occurs if (1¡®)(1+R) < c, that
is for extreme values of c and ®. If bidder 1 wants to deter bidder 2 from participating, she
has to participate in the takeover with a high probability. However, if bidder 2 is completely
deterred and never participates, bidder 1 only derives a positive pro¯t from her participation
if v1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)R ¸ c. Thus, if v1 < (1 ¡ ®)R + c, she is strictly better if she does not
participate. Bidder 1 does not participate with a probability (1 ¡ ®)R + c. If R is high
enough, this probability is non negligible. Bidder 1 is absent from the takeover process often
enough and if bidder 2 has a high valuation, he derives a strictly positive expected revenue
from a participation in the takeover. Thus, the deterrence is no longer complete. For high
values of v2, bidder 2 is better o® participating in the takeover battle.
The deterrence phenomenon becomes more progressive when taking into account the
minimum premium. It becomes a function of the size of the toehold, the participating costs
and the minimum premium. Let us consider their e®ects on the deterrence phenomenon.
² The participating cost, c. As in the standard case, without toehold, it has a negative
impact on bidders' participation since it deters bidders from participating when they
have low valuations and do not expect to make a pro¯t higher than the participating
cost. For the non-toeholder, this phenomenon is reinforced by the presence of the
toehold. Since the toeholder is more aggressive, the expected pro¯t of the non-toeholder
is lower. Thus, he is more likely to make a pro¯t lower than the participating cost. That
is why he participates with a lower probability than in the absence of toehold.
² The minimum premium, R. As in a standard case, it deters bidders with valuations
below it from participating in the takeover. Therefore, the higher R is, the lower is
the probability for the toeholder to participate. Thus, the non-toeholder fears less
the extra aggressiveness of the toeholder. This may more than counterbalance the
18The di®erence between equilibria satisfying the ¯rst or the second series of conditions are negligible. In
equilibria satisfying the ¯rst series of conditions, there is a strictly positive probability that, conditional on
participating, bidder 1 submits the lowest valuation for which bidder 2 participates in the takeover process.
This is not the case in an equilibrium satisfying the second series of conditions.
12negative impact that the minimum premium has on his incentives to participate. The
non-toeholder probability to participate may be locally increasing in R.
² The toehold, ®. It has a non ambiguous e®ect on participation decisions. For higher
values of ®, the toeholder participates more often in the takeover process since he needs
to buy a lower fraction of the target ¯rm to win. Besides, it is even more important
for him that, conditional on his losing the takeover contest, the ¯nal price be high.
The e®ect on the non-toeholder incentives to participate in the takeover process is
opposite. Since the toeholder participates more often and she bids more aggressively
for higher values of ®, the non-toeholder makes a lower expected pro¯t conditional on
participating in the takeover process. The higher is ®, the lower is the probability for
the non-toeholder to participate in the takeover.
A rise in ® has a clear-cut e®ect on participation decision. This is not the case as far
as target returns are concerned. A rise in ® has both a positive and a negative e®ect on
the price reached by the takeover process. It raises the probability that bidder 1 takes part
in the takeover process and increases the value of her bid but it also deters bidder 2 from
participating for a higher range of valuations and thus decreases his probability to participate.
In general, expected target returns are not a monotonic function of the size of the toehold.
Depending on the values of the other parameters, the e®ect of an increase of ® on the expected
revenue of shareholders may be positive or negative. Even if we ¯x c and R, this e®ect may
vary locally. The following example illustrates this issue.
Example 1 We consider the following setting: participating cost, c = 0:02 and minimum
premium, R = 0:15. Figure 1 represents shareholders' expected target returns depending on
the size of the toehold, ®. Expected target returns are ¯rst increasing then decreasing in the
size of the toehold.
5.3 Numerical applications, descriptions and commentaries
For technical reasons, we are unable to obtain the necessary conditions for the expected
revenue of the shareholders to follow the hump shaped pattern that we identi¯ed in example
1. Nevertheless, this shape can be observed for many other values of c and R. In order
to illustrate this statement, we exhibit a series of graphics of the expected revenue of the
takeover contest depending on the size of the toeholds for di®erent values of R and c. Of
course, these examples do not have the strength of an analytical resolution. However, this
is an applied issue and we believe that it is instructive to use these numerical applications.
They show that the observations made in the example 1 can be extended to a broader range
of con¯gurations.
13Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 represent expected target returns depending on ® for di®erent values
of c and R. These graphics indicate that, in many con¯gurations, the expected revenue of
shareholders is a non monotonic, hump-shaped, function of ®. Besides, the observation of
these graphics provides an intuition regarding the conditions for which this property holds.
It holds when R is not too high and c is not too small.
If R is large, the main issue is whether any bidder will participate. Deterrence of bidder
2 by bidder 1 is a second order e®ect. As bidder 1 only needs to buy a fraction (1 ¡
®) of the target ¯rm, her probability to participate increases with ®. If R is large, this
probability is still low and the deterrence e®ect is weak. Thus, it only marginally a®ects
bidder 2's participation decision and the major e®ect of the toehold is an increase in bidder
1's probability to participate. The global e®ect of a rise in ® on the expected price is always
positive.
If c is very small, the deterrence e®ect becomes weaker since bidder 2 participates even
if his expected pro¯t is low. Thus, the major consequence of the toehold is bidder 1's
overbidding. This overbidding is increasing in ® and always has a positive impact on the
¯nal price.
In contrast, if R is not too large and c is not extremely small, the expected ¯nal price is
a hump-shaped function of the size of the toehold. For low values of ®, bidder 1 when she
participates in the auction, is more aggressive, but not enough to notably deter bidder 2 from
participating. The extra aggressiveness, during the auction, overrules the deterrence e®ect, at
the time of the entry decision. The expected price is an increasing function of ®. For higher
values of ®, the deterrence e®ect dominates. Bidder 2 is often deterred and participates with
a low probability. Bidder 1 is more aggressive in case of contested takeovers. However, since
bidder 2 seldom participates, this aggressiveness is not useful for the remaining shareholders.
Therefore, expected target returns become a decreasing function of ®.
Estimating the values of c and R is a di±cult task and this is not the object of this paper.
Nevertheless, in the considered framework, considering the motivations that we gave for the
existence of the minimum premium, not related to the free-rider issue, intermediary values
of R seem to be appropriate. As regards the participating cost, we already explained why
we believe that it is not negligible.19 Therefore, it is reasonable to consider that c and R
are such that toeholds have a non monotonic e®ect on the price.20 Below a threshold ®¤,
the expected price increases in ®. Over this threshold, because of the deterrence e®ect, the
expected price decreases in ®.
These results may explain the di±culties for empirical studies to ¯nd a clear-cut e®ect of
19Remember that, with our normalization, c should not be compared to the ¯nal price paid to the share-
holders but to the bonus paid to them, or more precisely, to the distribution interval of this bonus.
20Besides, even though we chose not to take this element into account, R is likely to be decreasing in ®.
This reinforces the non monotonic trend.
14toeholds on the ¯nal price that we mentioned in the introduction. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989)
and Betton and Eckbo (2000) observe that toeholds decrease target returns, according to
Frank and Harris (1989), they have a positive e®ect and Stulz and al (1990) observe no e®ect
of toeholds on target returns. Our model provides an explanation for these con°icting results.
As a matter of fact, we derive from our model that target returns may be a non monotonic
function of the size of the toehold. These studies only consider the possible existence of a
positive or a negative e®ect. If our model captures some aspects of actual phenomena, it may
explain why they obtain so diverging results. Depending on the distribution of toeholds sizes
in their sample, they may observe di®erent e®ect of toeholds on target returns.
6 Applications and predictions
In this section, we apply our results to several aspects of the questions of the control and the
taking of control of ¯rms and propose testable predictions and suggest limits to the model.
6.1 The optimal size of a toehold
Let us consider the minimum premium, R and the participating cost, c as ¯xed, elements
of the market structure which is common knowledge and assume that these parameters are
such that expected target returns follow a hump-shaped function of the toehold size. It is
then possible to compute an optimal toehold ®¤, ®¤ being such that the expected revenue of
the remaining stockholders is maximized when a possible buyer owns a toehold of size ®¤.
For ® < ®¤, the deterrence phenomenon is weak. However, as ® is small, bidder 1 does
not bid much more aggressively than a bidder without toehold. Then, the expected price of
the remaining shares is not maximized. For ® > ®¤, the deterrence e®ect prevails. Other
possible bidders stay out of the takeover process too often. The expected revenue of the
remaining stockholders tends to decrease with the size of the toehold.
Thus, a board of administrators concerned about the revenue of all its stockholders should
make sure that no possible purchaser buys progressively a toehold substantially higher than
®¤. Otherwise, this potential buyer would deter too much other competitors from trying to
buy the ¯rm. Eventually, it would have a negative e®ect on the expected revenue of the other
shareholders.
Some legal dispositions seem to be related to this observation. For example, in many
legislations, any ¯rm who buys shares of another ¯rm, beyond some well-de¯ned thresholds,
must o±cially declare its intentions. In some cases, the ¯rm is even forced to make a takeover
o®er. One of the aim of these measures is precisely to protect the remaining shareholders
from a too powerful toeholder who would deter any other potential buyer from making a
takeover o®er.
156.2 How to ¯ght the deterrence e®ect
Suppose that a bidder yet holds a fraction ® of ¯rm A such that the deterrence phenomenon
exceeds the positive impact of the toehold. What can the board of ¯rm A do in order to
reduce the deterrence e®ect?
According to the terms and results of our model, the board should try to change the
minimum premium or to reduce participating costs. A priori, the board cannot a®ect the
value of the minimum premium. Thus, an adequate policy for the board would be to minimize
the participating costs. For this purpose, it could, for instance, destroy existing poison-pills.
However, it is doubtful that the high management have the right incentives to do so. If a
takeover succeeds, whoever the winner is, members of the high management are likely to lose
their jobs. Therefore, they prefer maintaining the probability of a successful takeover at a
low level.
In contrast, the high management could make the following statement: \If this stockholder
sets o® a takeover process, we will help any other competitor who could be interested in a
takeover. We will reduce his participating cost through any kind of alliance or by providing
the help of shareholder-friends". This type of commitment reminds of the white knight
searching process. The management has the right incentives to do so. Once a bidder ¯rst
announced his takeover attempt, the high management has incentives to ¯nd another possible
bidder. There is a common belief that the white knight will be more likely than the other
bidder to keep the high management, or a fraction of it, in place, out of gratitude. This
strategy is also in the stockholders interest, as it increases the expected ¯nal price.21 In
the model, this behavior is equivalent to the creation of di®erentiated entry costs, c1 and c2
with c2 < c1. This kind of attitude is often observed although, in numerous cases, the board
attempts are fruitless and no other competitor makes an o®er.
6.3 How to control safely a ¯rm with less than half of its shares
Let us consider the results through a di®erent angle. The toeholder point of view. We often
observe that a ¯rm has, de facto, the control of another ¯rm without owning 50% of its capital
and without even trying to buy these 50%. Our model could provide an explanation for this
kind of situation.
R and c are given, parts of the market structure with c not extremely low and R not
extremely high. Then, there exists an e ® < 1
2 such that if a ¯rm owns a fraction ® of ¯rm A,
it almost completely deters any other competitor from attempting to buy ¯rm A through a
takeover. If shareholdings are scattered, as a major shareholder, the ¯rm owning the toehold
21It is positive for the shareholders only as long as it does not deter too much bidder 1 from making an
o®er. However, since bidder 1 has more reasons than bidder 2 to participate, she is unlikely to be seriously
deterred.
16e ® has the e®ective control of ¯rm A without the need to buy the majority of ¯rm A's capital.
Besides, the probability that any other ¯rm tries to buy ¯rm A is extremely low. Therefore, it
may be useless while costly to buy the remaining necessary shares to own the 50%. Because of
its high toehold, the ¯rm can deter almost any other competitor from making an attempt to
buy ¯rm A. As long as having the e®ective control is the main objective, buying the majority
of the shares is almost super°uous.
6.4 Limits
We chose to restrain our study to a speci¯c distribution function, the uniform distribution
function. We already mentioned the impact of that choice. With a distribution function
which puts more weight on lower valuations, the deterrence phenomenon would be stronger.
With distribution functions which puts more weight on intermediary and high valuations the
deterrence phenomenon would be weaker.
We considered cases in which only one possible buyer owns a toehold. A more general
model would represent situations in which both bidders may own a fraction of the target
company. In such a case, results would crucially depend on the distribution of toeholds.
Bidders may own toeholds of di®erent sizes. If one bidder owned a large toehold and the
other a small one, we would obtain results close22 to the one we have presented. Now, if
bidders had toeholds of almost identical size, we would obtain extremely di®erent results.
The deterrence phenomenon that we highlighted would almost disappear. There would not
be any more a favored bidder who deters a less favored bidder. In that case, toeholds have a
positive e®ect on the ¯nal price and e±ciency (see intuitions of these results in Engelbrecht-
Wiggans (1994), Maasland and Onderstal (2002) and Ettinger (2002)).
The assumption that bidders perfectly know their valuations for the target company at
the time they decide to participate and incur the sunk cost is also a key element of the model.
If bidders were to discover their valuations after deciding to take part in the takeover and
to pay the cost, the equilibrium would be di®erent.23 Nevertheless, for some con¯gurations,
we could still observe a non monotonic e®ect of toeholds on target returns. However, such a
representation seems less accurate than the one we considered.
22However, even without a minimum premium, bidder 1, the bidder with the highest toehold, would not
completely deter bidder 2 from participating. Bidder 2 would participate with a positive probability, would
it only be to rise the ¯nal price. Since he owns a toehold, if he loses the takeover process, he also prefers the
¯nal price to be high.
23The equilibrium of this game is as follows. For c below a threshold c, both bidders always participate in
the takeover process. For intermediary values of c, between c and c, bidder 1 always participate and bidder 2
never participates. For c higher than c, no bidder ever participates. c is decreasing in ® and c is increasing in
®. Besides, bidder 2's participation decisions is not informative. Thus, bidder 1 submits b1(v1) (b1 being the
bidding function that we de¯ned in proposition 1)if her valuation is v1.
17A Proof of proposition 1
For bidder 2, it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid his valuation. Bidding that way, he wins
the auction when bidder 1 bids less than v2, in these cases, it is worth winning for bidder 2,
and never wins the auction when bidder 1 bids strictly more than v2; in these cases bidder 2
prefers losing.
These arguments are not valid for bidder 1 since she cares about the selling price when
bidder 2 obtains the good. If she loses the auction, she becomes the seller of her toehold and
prefers the price to be high. Bidding her valuation is not a dominant strategy.
However, as bidder 2's strategy is known, bidder 1 faces a simple optimization program
max
b1
(v1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)
b1
2
)b1 + ®(1 ¡ b1)b1




B Proof of proposition 2
First, we show that if ((d1;b1);(d2;b2)) is an equilibrium, then for 8i = 1;2, 9b vi such that
di(v) = 0 if v < b vi and di(v) = 1 if v > b vi.
Suppose that 9i;v;v such that v < v , di(v) = 1 and di(v) = 0. As di(v) = 1, the expected
revenue of bidder i with valuation v if he participates in the takeover must be at least c;
otherwise he would be strictly better o® not participating. We write it EUi(v;bi(v)) ¸ c24. If
bidding bi(v), bidder i never wins the auction then EUi(v;bi(v)) = EUi(v;bi(v)); otherwise
EUi(v;bi(v)) > EUi(v;bi(v)). Suppose i = 2, then as EU2(v;b2(v)) ¸ c, bidder 2 bidding
b2(v) must win the takeover with a strictly positive probability as otherwise his utility, gross of
the payment of the sunk cost, is equal to zero. If i = 1, because it is a dominated strategy for
bidder 2 with a valuation below c to participate, if bidder 1 participates in the takeover, she
wins it with a strictly positive probability. Then, 8i = 1;2, if bidder i participates, he wins the
auction with a strictly positive probability. Then, 8i = 1;2, EUi(v;bi(v)) > EUi(v;bi(v)) > c
and if bidder i has a valuation v, he is strictly better o® participating and bidding bi(v) than
non participating. Hence, di(v) = 0 is impossible.
b2 = Id is a dominant strategy since the arguments we gave in section 3 are still valid.
The inference that bidder 2 could make on bidder 1's valuation because bidder 1 participates
does not alter this result.
Bidder 1 has no dominant strategy. Besides, bidder 1 can infer information from bidder
2's decision to participate. At the equilibrium, if bidder 2 participates in the takeover, it
24EUi(b v;b b) is the expected utility of bidder i with valuation b v and biddingb b, if he participates in the takeover
process.
18means that v2 ¸ b v2. Besides, if bidder 1 loses the auction, her utility is strictly increasing
in the price paid by bidder 2. Then, at the equilibrium, if both bidders participate in the
auction, bidder 1 cannot bid strictly less than b v2. Therefore, bidder 2, if his valuation is b v2,
only makes a pro¯t when bidder 1 does not participate. At the equilibrium, we must have
b v1b v2 = c or b v2 = 1
Suppose that, if bidder 1 participates, whatever her valuation v1 is, she always quits the
takeover process when the price is b v2. She derives an expected utility, v1b v2 +®(1¡b v2)b v2 ¡c.
Consequently, b v1b v2+®(1¡b v2)b v2¡c is a lower bound on bidder 1's expected utility when her
valuation is b v1.
As long as 0 < c < 1 , we can show that corner solutions, b v1 = 0 or b v1 = 1; are
impossible. b v1 = 0 is not an equilibrium strategy since, with c > 0, bidder 2's best response
would be never to participate and, in that case, bidder 1 would rather not participate when
v1 < c. Now, suppose that b v1 = 1 with c < 1, then bidder 2's best response is b v2 = c and if
v1 > 1¡®(1¡c), bidder 1 can participate and bid c, his expected payo® is cv1+(1¡c)®c¡c >
c(1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ c)) + (1 ¡ c)®c ¡ c = 0. Bidder 1's expected payo® is higher if he participates
than if he stays out. b v1 = 1 cannot be part of an equilibrium.
Since bidder 1 must be indi®erent between participating and not participating for v1 = b v1,
we must have
b v1b v2 + ®(1 ¡ b v2)b v2 ¡ c · 0
We also found that b v1b v2 = c or b v2 = 1. Suppose that b v1b v2 = c then ®(1 ¡ b v2)b v2 · 0, since
b v2 > 0, this means that b v2 = 1. Hence, either b v2 = 1 or b v1b v2 = c which implies that b v2 = 1,
then, in any case, b v2 = 1. b v1 = c is the unique best response to b v2 = 1.
In order to sustain such an entry equilibrium, we must have 8v ¸ c, b1(v) ¸ 125 and
b2(1) = 1. Besides, bidder 1 should believe that, if bidder 2 participates, bidder 2's valuation
is 1. Q.E.D.
C Proof of Lemma 1
First, we must show that if ((d1;b1);(d2;b2)) is an equilibrium, then 8 i = 1;2, 9b vi such that
di(v) = 0 if v < b vi and di(v) = 1 if v > b vi. The proof of this point is the same as the one we
exhibited in the second paragraph of the proof of proposition 2.
Second, bidder 2's dominant strategy, if he participates, is to bid its valuation for the
reasons we gave before.
Bidder 1 faces an optimization problem close to the one we considered in section 3, the
25Such a bid is not dominated since bidder 1 has a strict preference for a higher price if she loses the auction.
19only di®erence is that at the equilibrium, if bidder 1 observes that bidder 2 participates,
she knows that bidder 2's valuation is in the interval [v¤
2;1]. Then bidder 1 maximizes the
following expression, choosing a b1 ¸ v¤
2, since bidding less than v¤
2 is a strictly dominated
strategy
v¤
2(v1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)R) + (b1 ¡ v¤




)) + (1 ¡ b1)®b1 (1)
= v¤
2(v1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)R) ¡ v¤




+ (v1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)
b1
2
)b1 + ®(1 ¡ b1)b1 (2)
The ¯rst part of the second expression does not depend on the choice of b1 and the second
part is maximized when b1 = v1+®
1+® (see the proof of proposition 1).
Now, we have to consider two cases :
² If v¤
2 · v1+®
1+® , b1 = v1+®
1+® is the solution of our maximization program (the second




1+® , then 8b1 ¸ v¤
2, the derivative of the expression (2) is negative and the
optimal bid for bidder 1 is v¤
2.
D Proof of proposition 3
Let us ¯rst eliminate corner solutions.
Suppose that v¤
1 = 0. As bidder 1 bids at least v¤
2, bidder 2 is fully deterred and par-
ticipates with probability zero. Then bidder 1 is strictly better o® not participating if
v1 < c + (1 ¡ ®)R. v¤
1 = 0 cannot be part of an equilibrium. Besides, v¤
2 = 0 cannot
be part of an equilibrium since participating to the takeover is costly.
Suppose that v¤
1 = 1, then bidder 2's best response is v¤
2 = c + R. For bidder 1 not to
participate with valuation v1 < 1, it must be the case that she does not derive a strictly
positive pro¯t if she participates when v1 = 1. Then
¡ c + (c + R)(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)R) + (1 ¡ c ¡ R)(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)
1 + c + R
2
) · 0 (3)
equivalent to
¡ R2 + 1 ¡ 2c + c2 + ® + ®R ¡ ®c2 · 0 (4)
® + ®R ¡ ®c2 > 0 and ¡R2 + 1 ¡ 2c + c2 = (1 ¡ c ¡ R)(1 ¡ c + R) > 0. As a result, the
inequation (4) cannot be veri¯ed and (v¤
1;v¤
2) = (1;c + R) cannot be an equilibrium.
Then any equilibrium must satisfy one of the following conditions:
- 0 < v¤
1 < 1 and v¤
2 = 1,
20- 0 < v¤
1;v¤





- 0 < v¤
1;v¤





which we study separately.
- 0 < v¤
1 < 1 and v¤
2 = 1
Necessary and su±cient conditions for such a (v¤
1; v¤
2) to be an equilibrium are as follows.
Bidder 1 is indi®erent between participating and not participating when her valuation is v¤
1.
Bidder 2, if his valuation is 1, is not strictly better o® participating that non participating26.
These conditions are equivalent to
v¤
1 = c + (1 ¡ ®)R and ¡ c + v¤
1(1 ¡ R) · 0
Replacing, in the second equation, v¤
1 by its expression in the ¯rst equation, we obtain
v¤
1 = c + (1 ¡ ®)R and (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ R) · c
- 0 < v¤
1;v¤





A su±cient and necessary condition for such a (v¤
1; v¤
2) to be an equilibrium is that for
i = 1;2, bidder i be indi®erent between participating and not participating if vi = v¤
i . This
is equivalent to the following conditions,27 for bidder 1 and bidder 2 respectively
v¤
2(v¤
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)R) + ®(1 ¡ v¤
2)v¤




2 ¡ R) ¡ c = 0 (6)
Formula (5) is equivalent to
v¤
2(v¤
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)R) + ®(v¤
2 ¡ R)(1 ¡ v¤
2) ¡ c = 0
- 0 < v¤
1;v¤
2 < 1 and v¤
2 · v1+®
¤1+®




1+® , in v¤
1, bidder 1 does
not bid v¤
2. Then, the equivalent of expressions (6) and (5) are respectively:
v¤
1(v¤



























= ®(1 ¡ v¤
2)R
26And from lemma 5.1, we can derive that at the equilibrium, bidder 1, whenever he participates, bids 1 so
that bidder 2 makes a pro¯t only when bidder 1 does not participate.
27From lemma 1, we know the bidding function of bidder 1 and 2 if they participate.
21The second equation is equivalent to
v¤








¡ ®R = c
Q.E.D.
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Figure 5: Shareholders expected revenue depending ® and R, for c = 0:05.
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